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The capacity of the transmission network determines the extent of integration of a multi-
national energy market. Cross-border externalities render coordination of network mainte-
nance and investments across countries valuable. Is it then optimal to collect powers in the
hands of a single regulator? Should a common system operator manage the entire network?
I show that optimal network structure depends on (i) how the common regulator would bal-
ance the interests of the di⁄erent member states; (ii) how the gains from market integration
vary across countries; (iii) network characteristics (substitutability versus complementarity);
and (iv) the social cost of operator rent.
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The European Commission (2007) views the completion of an integrated European energy mar-
ket essential for ensuring competitiveness, sustainability and security of energy supply in Europe.
Market integration depends crucially on the transmission network connecting the member states
being capable of reliably transporting energy from power plants in one country to consumers in
another. Increasing shares of solar and wind energy place additional requirements on the grid
as production and energy ￿ ows become more volatile. The transmission network is a natural
monopoly because it is too expensive to build competing networks. Absent a competitive pres-
sure, establishing and maintaining an e¢ cient multi-national transmission network boils down
to implementing optimal multi-national regulatory policies.
Most liberalized electricity markets have been deregulated one country at a time. Owing
to the national scope of liberalization, also transmission regulation has been national in scope
whereby national regulatory agencies govern national system operators responsible for managing
the national transmission networks. The question is whether this national transmission gover-
nance structure is optimal any longer in a multi-national energy market.1 In a multi-national
energy market, improvements in grid capacity at home creates externalities abroad because en-
ergy ￿ ows and prices change across the entire market with the removal of each transmission
bottleneck. With too narrow a focus on domestic e⁄ects, national regulatory agencies run the
risk of ignoring the externalities abroad when devising regulatory policy for the national system
operator.
Two examples from the Nordic electricity market illustrate the cross-border externalities
of transmission capacity. The Nordic electricity market was the world￿ s ￿rst multi-national
liberalized electricity market and now spans Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In the
spring of 2008, main transmission lines connecting southern Norway and southern Sweden broke
down on the Norwegian side, severely limiting export capacity to Sweden. One year later the
connections were still not back to full capacity. According to the Norwegian regulator, the
break downs were largely due to insu¢ cient maintenance by the Norwegian system operator,
Statnett. Admitting that the repairs were taking an unusually long time, Statnett emphasized
that the security of supply for Norwegian consumers was never jeopardized. Meanwhile, the
consumers in southern Norway had been enjoying comparatively lower electricity prices. The
e⁄ects on consumers and producers in Sweden (or elsewhere) seem to have been absent from the
Norwegian discussion.
In the spring of 2009, the European Commission opened proceedings against the Swedish
system operator, Svenska Kraftn￿t, for the abuse of its dominant position as the sole provider
of Swedish transmission capacity. The allegation was that Svenska Kraftn￿t limited exports to
Denmark to alleviate domestic congestion problems stemming from excess demand in southern
Sweden. By cutting the out￿ ow of electricity, Svenska Kraftn￿t was able to export price increases
from southern Sweden to Denmark thereby achieving the goal of a uniform electricity price
1Large countries, like the US, are divided into regional electricity markets with regional regulatory agencies
and regional grid monopolies. Market integration then is a question of connecting multiple regional markets into
a larger one. The theoretical framework of this paper applies to this case, too.
2throughout Sweden. Denmark complained that Svenska Kraftn￿t did not take into account the
costs to the Danish consumers of the export limitations.
With the cross-border externalities in mind, would it not be better to establish a common
regulatory agency responsible for the entire transmission network? Should the national system
operators be merged into a single common system operator? This paper analyzes these horizontal
aspects of optimal transmission network structure. The discussion of network structure has so
far centered around the costs and bene￿ts of vertical separation of transmission operation from
production; see e.g. Cremer et al. (2006) for an analysis and Pollitt (2008) for an account
of the arguments. For the fear that integrated utilities will discriminate against competitors
and invest inadequately in their networks, the EU recommends full ownership unbundling of
transmission and production assets (EU, 2009b). However important vertical structure may
be, overall network performance depends crucially on the incentives induced by the regulatory
policies adopted by the di⁄erent member states, which is precisely the topic of this paper.
The establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, ACER, and the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, ENTSO, bears witness to
the importance EU policy makers attach to cross-border coordination of regulatory policies and
system operation.
I consider a two-country energy market with interconnected networks. Network reliability
increases with maintenance spending in both networks. Gains from energy trade render network
reliability valuable. The scope of regulation is to provide the system operator(s) with the
appropriate incentives for network maintenance while minimizing maintenance cost and operator
rent. First-best optimal spending occurs at the point at which the marginal bene￿t of network
reliability equals the marginal social maintenance cost.
Two complications render network structure important for network performance. First, be-
cause the gains from energy market integration vary across countries, the member states di⁄er
in their valuation of network reliability. These asymmetries are not likely to vanish with the
introduction of a common regulatory agency (CRA). The desirability of establishing a single
regulator depends on how well these di⁄erences are reconciled within the CRA. Second, an in-
formational asymmetry is the source of an agency problem between the regulator(s) and the
system operator(s). The regulator has insu¢ cient information to assess whether network per-
formance is inferior for exogenous reasons (low productivity) or endogenous reasons (insu¢ cient
maintenance). By understating the productivity of the network, a system operator can secure
itself excessive transfers relative to the cost of maintaining the network. The nature of this
agency problem depends on how system operation is organized.
As optimal network structure is both a question of how many regulators and how many
system operators there should be, a number of potential network structures need to be compared
against one another. The Nordic electricity market exempli￿es the governance structure labelled
Separation in Table 1: Every member state has its own national system operator (NSO) regulated
by a national regulatory agency (NRA). An advocated contender is Integration whereby the
responsibility for managing the entire transmission grid lies upon a common system operator
(CSO). A common regulatory agency (CRA) governs the CSO. Common regulation constitutes
3a compromise between Separation and Integration and features a set of NSOs jointly regulated
by a CRA. To complete the picture, Common agency describes a situation whereby multiple
national regulatory agencies independently regulate a single CSO. Although relevant in other
regulated sectors such as telecommunications, Common agency does not appear to be a likely
network transmission structure. Discussions of the merits of having a single system operator
seem to implicitly assume a complementary coordination of regulatory policies. For example, an
investigation of the desirability of a Nordic system operator concluded that national governments
should then have to relinquish some (regulatory) autonomy, else interference from the national
governments would create ine¢ ciencies in system operation (EMG, 2008). I therefore skip a
detailed analysis of Common agency at this stage, although one might want to consider it for
the sake of completeness.
National regulatory agencies Common regulatory agency
National system operators Separation Common regulation
Common system operator Common agency Integration
Table 1: A taxonomy of network governance structures
Under Separation, the two national regulatory agencies (NRAs) play a non-cooperative game
against each other whereby each NRA chooses its regulatory policy to maximize national wel-
fare given the choice of policy by the other NRA. This lack of policy coordination creates two
distortions. Internalizing only the domestic gains from market integration, the NRAs provide
their national system operators (NSOs) insu¢ cient incentives for network maintenance. As a
consequence, overall network reliability is too low under Separation. Second, the NSO in the
country with the highest gains from trade spends too much on maintenance relative to the other
NSO. This productive ine¢ ciency arises whenever the perceived marginal bene￿t of network
reliability di⁄ers across countries. Asymmetric information further exacerbates maintenance
under-spending. Suppose an NRA wants to induce increased maintenance spending of its NSO
whenever the national network is of low productivity. Due to asymmetric information between
the NRA and the NSO about true productivity, the NRA cannot target spending directly to-
wards the low-productivity network, but is forced to compensate the NSO even if the network
actually is in a good shape. This spill-over e⁄ect, or informational rent, yields a virtual marginal
maintenance cost in excess of the marginal social maintenance cost, which distorts maintenance
spending in low productivity networks even further.
Establishing a common regulatory agency (CRA) takes care of the productive ine¢ ciency
because maintenance spending now is optimally coordinated across the network. However, the
distortions in aggregate maintenance spending do not necessarily vanish with the abolishment
of national regulatory agencies. Instead, the distortions may be accentuated. Assume, for
example, that most of the gains from market integration fall upon one of the countries, whereas
the country with the least to gain from integration holds decisive control over the CRA. The CRA
then understates the marginal bene￿t of network reliability, providing the system operator(s)
4insu¢ cient maintenance incentives. In this case, network reliability is so low that Separation
welfare dominates Common regulation and Integration despite the productive ine¢ ciencies under
Separation. The key to establishing a well-functioning common regulatory agency is to ensure
a balanced political in￿ uence across the member states. With an equal distribution of political
power, no member state can exert enough in￿ uence over the regulatory policy to tilt it in one￿ s
own favour: Aggregate spending is near the social optimum, and Common regulation welfare
dominates Separation.
How to organize system operation depends crucially on the characteristics of the transmission
network and on the social cost of operator rent. Consider the case with two NSOs. Under the
assumption of network complementarity, the marginal value of maintenance spending in one
part of the network is higher, the higher is productivity in the other part of the network. Under
network complementarity, the home NSO exerts a negative informational rent externality on the
foreign NSO by understating the productivity of its network. The perceived marginal value of
maintenance spending abroad then is understated, and the informational rent of the foreign NSO
falls because informational rent is an increasing function of maintenance spending. By merging
system operation into a single CSO, the regulator forces the system operators to internalize
the negative rent externality through cross-subsidization, thereby reducing overall informational
rent.
The superior ability of the CSO to jointly understate productivity of the entire network adds
to the virtual marginal maintenance cost of low productivity networks under Integration. This
extra maintenance cost tends to depress optimal maintenance spending below the optimal level
under Common regulation for the case when both national networks are of low productivity. The
downward incentive distortion is weaker the lower is the social cost of operator rent. However,
under network substitutability, low productivity in one part of the network raises the marginal
value of maintenance spending in the other part of the network. This substitution e⁄ect pulls
in favour of higher maintenance spending. The substitution e⁄ect dominates the cost e⁄ect
whenever the social cost of operator rent is low. In this case, a CSO understating productivity
in one part of its network exerts a positive informational rent externality on the other part of
the network. In the presence of positive informational rent externalities, the regulator optimally
splits system operation between a set of national system operators to mitigate the exercise of
agency power.
Speci￿cally, this paper contributes to the understanding of network regulation in multi-
national energy markets by studying the costs and bene￿ts of centralized regulation and of
merging system operation. This is the ￿rst integrated study of these horizontal aspects of
network regulation, as far as I know. The focus has so far been on vertical separation of
transmission and production.
More generally, I contribute to the literature on multi-contracting. Multi-contracting de-
scribes a situation where one or more principals contract with one or more agents. The present
paper addresses the normative aspect of multi-contracting by analyzing the socially optimal
contract structure. In a uni￿ed framework, I study the welfare implications of changing the
number of principals (regulators) as well as the number of agents (system operators). The ex-
5isting literature is more partial in considering either the optimal number of agents assuming a
single principal (see Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for a survey), or analyzing the optimal
number of principals assuming a single agent (see Martimort (2007) for a survey of such common
agency models). The ￿nding that more principals as well as more agents sometimes are better
than a single principal and a single agent vindicates a broader perspective. In the present model,
Separation welfare dominates Integration whenever a country with little to gain from market
integration would possess a dominating in￿ uence over the common regulatory agency and there
are positive informational rent externalities.
A benevolent common regulatory agency which can commit to complete long-term contracts
can always replicate any contracts implemented by the national regulatory agencies and can
potentially do better. Centralized regulation is always optimal in this case. Conversely, decen-
tralized regulation can be optimal only if (i) the CRA is not benevolent; (ii) has commitment
problems or (iii) there are problems of contractual incompleteness at the centralized level. The
present paper explores the ￿rst, political economy motive by allowing individual countries to
exercise political in￿ uence over the common regulatory agency.2 The basic trade-o⁄ between
centralized and decentralized regulation in this setting is between internalizing cross-border ex-
ternalities of network reliability versus tailoring regulatory policies to each individual country
re￿ ecting di⁄erences in how they value network reliability. This externality/bias trade-o⁄ is
classical in studies of political integration and dates back at least to Oates (1972). Ellingsen
(1998) early on noted how asymmetric gains from integration favoured decentralization, a result
which also appears in the present context. The importance of political balance for the desir-
ability of centralization has gone relatively unnoticed as far as I can see (although the result is
straightforward) - possibly because most models assume majority voting. La⁄ont and Pouyet
(2003) is an exception. They study a model of multi-national procurement where political dis-
tortions arise from a tension between shareholders and non-shareholders. The centralized buyer
places less weight on consumer surplus than ￿rm rent if shareholders are in majority, but cares
nothing about ￿rm rent if shareholders are in minority. Opposite to this paper, centralized
procurement welfare dominates decentralized procurement if and only if in￿ uence is asymmet-
rically distributed between shareholders and non-shareholders. This result can be traced to
a peculiar speci￿cation of the objective function of the centralized buyer in the model: Under
shareholder majority the weight of consumer surplus is higher the larger is shareholder majority.
Consumer surplus and ￿rm rent have near equal weights in the limit when almost everybody is
a shareholder, in which case the centralized buyer acts almost as the benevolent social planner.
A complicating factor in analysing political integration of regulation lies in characterizing the
equilibria of the game played by independent regulators. A multi-principal Revelation Principle
greatly facilitates the analysis of Separation in the present setting setting. Under the plausible
2Olsen and Torsvik (1993) analyse limited commitment. They show that decentralized regulation can mitigate
dynamic ine¢ ciencies stemming from post-contractual exploitation by the centralized regulator.
Under complete contracting framework, and all necessary policy coordination takes place at the level of reg-
ulation. While a ￿tting description of capacity regulation, the system operator performs complicated tasks,
such a balancing energy supply, which are not completely contractable. Multi-national energy markets require
detailed coordination of cross-border system operation. Contractual incompleteness and optimal delegation in
multi-national energy markets are interesting topics for future research.
6assumption of transparent regulation, I can without loss of generality constrain attention to
direct and incentive compatible regulatory contracts, and there is a unique equilibrium in the
game with multiple principals and multiple agents. Under the standard assumption of "opaque"
regulation, the set of equilibria could potentially be very large (Yamashita, 2010), and the
restriction to direct and incentive compatible contracts might come at a loss in generality (Attar
et al., 2010).
This paper emphasizes the role of informational rent externalities in determining the op-
timal number of system operators. Dana (1993) is the ￿rst to emphasize the importance of
informational rent externalities for the optimal market structure of a regulated industry. He
focuses exclusively on negative rent externalities as a motivation for granting monopoly rights.
Serevinov (2008) studies optimal organization of production in a model with a single principal
and two agents. He shows that the optimal mode of organization (number of agents) depends
on whether the value of information is superadditive or subadditive, which here corresponds to
positive versus negative informational rent externalities. Serevinov (2008) establishes the link
between the degree of substitutability/complementarity of inputs and additivity. The present
paper extends Serevinov (2008) by studying also the optimal number of principals. It further
complements his analysis by linking informational externalities to the social cost of informational
rent.
2 The Model
Two countries, indexed by i 6= j 2 f1;2g, distribute energy through interconnected national
transmission networks. The union of the two national networks de￿nes the common network.
Interconnection enables energy trade between the two countries. Denote by SI
i the sum of
producer and consumer surplus in country i if the common network runs at full capacity, in
which case the market is integrated, and by SA
i if the common network operates at reduced
capacity. Market integration is bene￿cial to both countries, 4Si = SI
i ￿ SA
i > 0, i = 1;2, but
the gains from trade might be asymmetrically distributed: 4S1 6= 4S2 in general. There are two
reasons why both countries might bene￿t from integration. Increased trade improves welfare
in both countries under imperfect competition in both national markets. Second, improved
network capacity leads to a better utilization of total generation capacity and therefore lower
aggregate production costs. Both countries pro￿t from integration if these cost reductions are
evenly distributed across the countries.3
Network reliability equals the probability P(q) that the common network runs at full capacity
and depends on the quality q = (q1;q2) of the national networks. Network reliability is symmetric
and an increasing and concave function of quality: P0
i > 0, P00




21 for all q,
where P0
i = @P=@qi, P00
ii = @2P=@q2
i and P00
ij = @2P=@qi@qj. Under network complementarity,
marginal network reliability is increasing in the quality of the other part of the network: P00
ij > 0
for all q. Conversely, marginal network reliability is decreasing in the quality of the other part
3Auriol and Biancini (2009) analyse the welfare implications of market integration when ￿rms are subject to
regulation.
7of the network, P00
ij < 0 for all q, under network substitutability.
Network quality is the product of the exogenous productivity ￿i 2 f￿;￿g of network i and the
resources mi ￿ 0 spent on maintaining network i: qi = ￿imi, i = 1;2. I assume that the quality
qi of network i is directly observable and contractible, but never its two components ￿i and mi.
Productivity in network i is low (￿i = ￿ > 0) with probability 1￿v and high (￿i = ￿ > ￿) with
probability v. With this (common knowledge) stochastic structure, productivity ￿ = (￿1;￿2) is
stochastically independent across the two networks.
Depending on the network governance structure, either a common system operator (CSO)
runs the entire common network or two national system operators (NSOs) run one national
network each. Either way, the system operator receives a transfer ti for operating network i
and obtains the rent ui = ti ￿  (mi) by devoting mi resources on the maintenance of network
i, where  (￿) is the unobservable maintenance cost, which is increasing and convex:  0(0) = 0,
 00 > 0 and  000 ￿ 0.4
Ex post social welfare equals the expected gains from trade plus operator rent minus the
social cost of transfers:
P(q)(4S1 + 4S2) +
P
i=1;2(ui ￿ (1 + ￿)ti),
where ￿ > 0 is the shadow price of public funds and the same in both countries. Regulation
here a⁄ects the expected gains of trade only through its e⁄ect on network reliability. There is
no reason why network structure as such should have any direct e⁄ect on the gains of trade 4S1
and 4S2. If operator revenues accrued from user fees instead of being tax ￿nanced transfers as
in the present model, regulation would have a direct e⁄ect on the gains from trade. User fees
would complicate the analysis technically without adding much in terms of qualitative insights;
see, e.g., Chapter 2 in La⁄ont and Tirole (1993) for an analysis of the analogy between tax-based
and user-based revenues.
The timing is as follows: Nature draws ￿. NSO i learns ￿i, but does not know more about
￿j than the regulator(s). The CSO learns the entire productivity vector ￿. The regulator(s)
commit(s) to direct regulatory contract(s), which consist of a regulatory policy qi = (qi; b qi; e qi;q
i)
and a transfer policy ti = (ti;b ti;e ti;ti) for each network i = 1;2. Upon observing the regulatory
contracts (q1;t1) and (q2;t2), each NSO, alternatively the CSO, decides whether to accept the
regulatory contract or refuse.5 A system operator who turns down the contract receives reserva-
tion utility 0. If they both accept (I assume that this is always socially optimal), the regulated
quality of network i is qi and the associated transfer to network i is ti if both networks report
high productivity and q
i versus ti if they both report low productivity. In case of dissimilar
productivity reports (￿i = ￿ > ￿ = ￿j), the quality/transfer pair equals (b qi;b ti) to the high
4The model is cast in terms of network reliability and maintenance spending. An alternative interpretation
would be to view P as overall network capacity, mi as real capacity investment in network i, ￿i as productivity
and  (￿) as the (unobservable) capital cost.
5Contracting is under asymmetric information with the timing of this model. It is always debatable whether
the regulated ￿rm has all relevant information about its own productivity at the contracting stage. However, it
is probably realistic to assume that ￿rms can shut down their production at any point if it becomes unpro￿table.
With an interim participation constraint, the analysis is similar to the one presented here.
8productivity network and (e qj;e tj) to the low productivity network. Regulation is transparent:
The set of regulatory contracts as well as the productivity reports of the NSOs are common
knowledge. Transparency simpli￿es the analysis and allows me to emphasize the welfare e⁄ects
associated with di⁄erent network structures, thus eliminating e⁄ects stemming from ad hoc re-
strictions on the set of enforceable contracts. Moreover, the transparency assumption is realistic
in this setting. The European Commission (2007), for example, views transparency essential
for a properly working market. I do not study the welfare e⁄ects of transparency here, but
see Combes et al. (1997) who show that transparent regulation Pareto dominates "opaque"
regulation in a Cournot model of regulated trade since the cost e¢ cient ￿rm has a larger market
share under transparency (it is still open whether this result extends to the case of strategic
complementarities).
Using mi = qi=￿i and ti = ui +  (mi), I can write expected national welfare in country
i = 1;2 entirely in terms of quality Q = (q1;q2) and operator rent ui = (ui; b ui; e ui;ui):
Wi(Q;ui) = v2[P(q1;q2)4Si ￿ (1 + ￿) (qi=￿) ￿ ￿ui]
+v(1 ￿ v)[(P(b q1; e q2) + P(e q1; b q2))4Si ￿ (1 + ￿)( (b qi=￿) +  (e qi=￿)) ￿ ￿(b ui + e ui)]
+(1 ￿ v)2[P(q
1;q




To highlight the importance of network structure, I evaluate expected welfare and the optimal
policies under the various structures against the ￿rst-best, complete information solution. Under
complete information about productivity and for any regulatory policy, it is optimal to set
operator rent as low as possible since transfers bear with them a social cost. System operation
is voluntary. With an outside option equal to zero, the minimal transfers are at the point at
which system operation is just pro￿table: u1 = u2 = 0. To ensure the existence of an optimum,
I employ a boundary condition:
For i 6= j = 1;2, 9k > 0 such that P0
i(q)(4S1 + 4S2) < (1 + ￿) 0(qi=￿)=￿ 8qi > k, 8qj ￿ 0
(BC)
throughout the analysis. This boundary condition is satis￿ed if the marginal maintenance cost
goes to in￿nity or if marginal network reliability goes to zero as maintenance spending goes to
in￿nity. Straightforward maximization of aggregate welfare W1(Q;0)+W2(Q;0) over Q yields:




2 = qfb = (qfb; b qfb; e qfb;qfb),
and characterized by:
P0
1(qfb;qfb)(4S1 + 4S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(qfb=￿))=￿
P0
1(b qfb; e qfb)(4S1 + 4S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(b qfb=￿))=￿
P0
1(e qfb; b qfb)(4S1 + 4S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(e qfb=￿))=￿
P0
1(qfb;qfb)(4S1 + 4S2) = (1 + ￿)( 0(qfb=￿))=￿.
(2)
9Under quality complementarity, qfb > b qfb and e qfb > qfb, whereas b qfb > qfb and e qfb > qfb under
quality substitutability.
The proof is in the Appendix.
The ￿rst-best policy arises at the point at which the marginal bene￿t of network reliability equals
the marginal social maintenance cost. Network reliability is a public good: The value of network
reliability depends on the aggregate gains from trade. Therefore, the optimal policy is symmetric,
although the gains from energy market integration may be asymmetrically distributed across
countries (4S1 6= 4S2). The optimal distribution of maintenance spending across the network
occurs at the point at which the marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of









which is independent of the aggregate gains from trade.
Quality varies less with productivity across the networks when network qualities are comple-
ments rather than substitutes. Under complementarity a productivity increase leads to higher
quality in all parts of the network. Under substitutability, higher quality in one part of the
network leads to lower quality in the other.
From an inspection of the conditions for optimal network quality, one might be tempted to
conclude that higher gains from trade would always yield more network maintenance. This is not
necessarily true. Under quality substitutability, more maintenance in one part of the network
has the e⁄ect of depressing the marginal bene￿t of maintenance in the other. In principle,
this substitution e⁄ect could dominate the direct "income" e⁄ect, rendering network quality an
inferior good. In this paper I restrict attention to the case where network quality is a normal
good, in the sense that an increase in the aggregate gains from trade leads to higher maintenance
spending in all parts of the network under ￿rst-best regulation. A su¢ cient condition on network





j for all q ￿ 0, i 6= j = 1;2. (NG)
If the degree of substitutability between qi and qj is su¢ ciently weak, the direct e⁄ect dominates
the substitution e⁄ect. Condition (NG) is not particularly restrictive: It is satis￿ed under quality
complementarity (P00
ij > 0) and even under perfect substitutability (P(q) = p(q1 + q2)).
Under complete information it does not matter whether there is a common system operator
(CSO) or two national system operators (NSOs). In this model, a CSO spending m1 and m2 on
maintenance in the two parts of the networks incurs the same maintenance cost  (m1)+ (m2)
as two NSOs spending m1 and m2 in their respective networks. Maintenance economies of scale
would favour the creation of a single CSO under complete information, whereas two NSOs would
be better under diseconomies of scale. The present paper emphasizes the e⁄ects of political
10constraints and incentives on optimal network structure. Therefore, I have not signed cost
advantages in any direction.
3.1 Separation
Under Separation, a national regulatory agency (NRA) in each country has the responsibil-
ity for regulating the performance of a national system operator (NSO). I restrict attention
to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) contracts; no NSO can strictly bene￿t from
misrepresenting its productivity nor shutting down no matter what the other NSO reports. Un-
der dominant strategy implementation regulatory policies are robust to collusive coordination
among the NSOs and to any misconceptions each system operator might have about the actions
of the other. Owing to transparency, a multi-principal Revelation Principle applies to this analy-
sis: Every equilibrium of a regulation game with a more general message space, can equivalently
be represented as the equilibrium of a game where both regulators have committed to o⁄ering
direct DSID mechanisms; see the Appendix.6
By transparency, NRA i can condition the regulatory policy on the productivity reports of
both NSOs. Notwithstanding stochastic independence of information, NRA i still bene￿ts from
conditioning regulation on both reports because network reliability depends on quality in all
parts of the network. Any contract accepted by the NSO in country i = 1;2 must ￿rst satisfy
the participation constraint
ui ￿ 0, (PCS)
whereby it is required that system operation always be pro￿table no matter the system operator￿ s
own productivity and its subjective belief about the productivity report of the other. The ￿rst
requirement of incentive compatibility is that the high productivity NSO in country i = 1;2
cannot bene￿t from understating productivity independently of its beliefs about the productivity
report of the NSO in country j:
ui ￿ e ui +  (e qi=￿) ￿  (e qi=￿) = e ui + ￿(e qi)
b ui ￿ ui +  (q
i=￿) ￿  (q




The high productivity NSO can always secure itself a positive rent by understating productiv-
ity, as it must spend comparatively little, qi=￿ versus qi=￿, on maintenance to reach a given
level qi of quality. The value of this advantage is precisely the cost di⁄erential ￿(qi) above.
To preserve incentive compatibility, NRA i must compensate NSO i this informational rent.
The informational rent is increasing in the regulated quality of the low productivity network
owing to decreasing returns to maintenance spending ( 00 > 0,  000 ￿ 0): ￿ is increasing and
convex (￿0(0) = 0, ￿00 > 0). The second requirement of incentive compatibility is that the low
6If the regulatory contracts were not public (transparent), the restriction to direct and incentive compatible
contracts might come at a loss in generality (Attar et al., 2010). Also, the set of equilibria could potentially be
very large (Yamashita, 2010).
11productivity NSO is always better o⁄ reporting the truth than overstating productivity to ￿:
e ui ￿ ui ￿ ￿(qi), ui ￿ b ui ￿ ￿(b qi). (ICS)
The dishonest low productivity NSO is worse o⁄ than the honest high productivity NSO due to
the former type￿ s competitive disadvantage of delivering quality.
The regulator in country i chooses the policy (qi;ui) to maximize expected national welfare
Wi(Q;ui) subject to the above participation and incentive constraints, taking the policy (qj;uj)




2) constitute a Nash Equilibrium
under Separation if each contract is DSID and no regulator can raise national welfare by a
unilateral deviation to another DSID contract. By standard arguments, see e.g. Chapter 1
in La⁄ont and Tirole (1993), the DSID constraints can be replaced by a binding participation
constraint for the low type (e ui = ui = 0), binding downward incentive constraints (IC
S), and
the monotonicity constraint
qi ￿ e qi, b qi ￿ q
i. (3)
The regulator wants to minimize operator rent due to the shadow price of public funds. It is the
high productivity NSO that must be compensated for revealing its type, because this NSO has
the most to gain from lying. It is unnecessary to leave any rent to the low productivity NSO
because it cannot bene￿t from lying about its type. Substituting ui = (￿(e qi);￿(q
i);0;0) into
(1), I can write national welfare under Separation entirely in terms of quality Q:
WS
i (Q) = v2[P(q1;q2)4Si ￿ (1 + ￿) (qi=￿)]


















i (Q) subject to qi ￿ e qi and b qi ￿ q
i yields:
Lemma 2 There exists a unique equilibrium QS = (qS
1;qS
2) under Separation (for generic pa-
rameter values), where qS
1 = (qS
1; b qS
1 ; e qS
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and analogously for qS
2 = (qS
2; b qS
2 ; e qS
2 ;qS
2). Network reliability is too low relative to the ￿rst-best
policy if network quality is a normal good (condition (NG) holds), but the country with the largest
gains from energy market integration spends too much on maintenance relative to the other.
12The proof is in the Appendix.
The equilibrium policies qS
1 and qS
2 deviate from the ￿rst-best solution qfb in three respects,
two of which have to do with the non-cooperative manner in which the regulatory policies are
set under Separation. Network reliability is a public good. By failing to take into account the
positive externality of increased network reliability, the national regulatory agency spends too
little on maintenance: The full marginal e⁄ect is P0
i(q)(4S1 +4S2), whereas NRA i only cares
about P0
i(q)4Si.
Second, the regulatory policies su⁄er from productive ine¢ ciencies. The distribution of
maintenance spending is given by
￿P0
1(b qS

















when the two networks are asymmetric (￿1 = ￿ > ￿2 = ￿). With asymmetric gains from
trade (say, 4S1 > 4S2), the high-productivity network tends to spend comparatively much on
maintenance because the perceived relative marginal bene￿t of network reliability is too high.
Third, maintenance under-spending is exacerbated by the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion. Suppose the regulator wants to increase maintenance spending in the low productivity
NSO, e.g. raise e qi marginally. To preserve the pro￿tability of system operation the regulator
must increase the transfers to the low productivity NSOs in proportion to the extra maintenance
cost. Since transfers are costly, the marginal social maintenance cost is (1+￿) 0(e qi=￿)=￿. Under
asymmetric information, all types of NSOs bene￿t from more high-powered incentives because
the regulator cannot ex ante target transfers to low productivity NSOs. To preserve incentive
compatibility, the regulator must compensate also the high productivity NSO by awarding it
additional transfers. This spill-over e⁄ect, the informational rent, leads to a virtual marginal
maintenance cost






in excess of the marginal social maintenance cost. Under asymmetric information, optimal
maintenance spending is found at the point at which the marginal bene￿t of network reliability
equals the virtual marginal maintenance cost. The higher is the shadow price ￿ of public funds,
the higher is the probability v that the NSO is of a high productivity and the stronger is the cost
advantage of the high productivity NSO (the higher is ￿0), the higher is the virtual marginal
maintenance cost and the lower is equilibrium maintenance spending.
Brainard and Martimort (1996) analyse a multi-principal, multi-agent game with some sim-
ilarities to the game above. In a game of strategic trade policy under asymmetric information,
each government o⁄ers the home ￿rm a production subsidy to compete with an equally subsidized
foreign ￿rm in a third country market. Under the assumption that each government maximizes
the domestic ￿rm￿ s rent (less the social cost of the subsidy), production subsidies are excessive
because product market competition locks the two governments in a prisoner￿ s dilemma. Asym-
metric information serves to reduce policy distortions by increasing the virtual marginal cost of
13production subsidies. In the present context, the fundamental coordination problem stems from
free riding on a public good (network reliability), not competition. The focus is on aggregate
welfare (including consumer￿ s surplus) and not on ￿rm rent. Consequently, production subsidies
are too small, and asymmetric information only adds to the problem. Brainard and Marti-
mort (1996) restrict attention to the symmetric case and therefore do not address productive
ine¢ ciencies stemming from asymmetric gains from trade.7 Finally, a multiplicity of equilibria
complicates their welfare analysis, whereas the present model yields a unique equilibrium.
3.2 Common regulation
Asymmetric gains from energy market integration (4S1 6= 4S2) imply that the two national
regulatory agencies (NRAs) choose di⁄erent policies under Separation (qS
1 6= qS
2). Under Com-
mon regulation, the regulatory responsibility is collected in the hands of a common regulatory
agency (CRA). Yet, con￿ ict over the optimal regulatory policy is not likely to vanish with the
introduction of a common regulatory agency if the asymmetric gains from trade remain also
under Common regulation. The desirability of Common regulation then depends on how the
preferences of the di⁄erent countries are aligned within the CRA. The simplest way of intro-
ducing political con￿ ict is to assume that the CRA maximizes a weighted average of national
welfare
￿1W1(Q;u1) + ￿2W2(Q;u2), (￿1;￿2) ￿ 0, ￿1 + ￿1 = 1.
A relevant special case of this representation is majority voting whereby whoever holds the
majority in the board of directors, exercises dictatorial powers over the design the regulation
(￿i = 1 if country i is in majority).
This seemingly innocuous representation carries the seeds of severe political exploitation.
The common regulatory agency has the powers to tax the inhabitants in both countries to
￿nance system operation. Under simple majority rule, the CRA tailors its policy to maximize
welfare Wi(Q;ui) in the majority country i, independently of the consequences for welfare in the
minority country j. With a perceived shadow price of public funds equal to zero in country j, the
CRA would pro￿t from collecting excessive transfers from country j to ￿nance NSO i￿ s system
operation. A proportionality rule would curb such transfer exploitation. Under proportionality
transfers should stand in relation to the cost of system operation in the country where they are
collected. Proportionality is not enough, however. Under simple majority rule, the majority
still has an incentive to overinvest in the minority network and ￿nance it by means of local
transfers. Increased network reliability bene￿ts the majority, but the perceived shadow price on
transfers is minimal (@Wi=@qj > 0). This problem of excessive network investment is relieved
by the imposition of a non-discrimination rule whereby maintenance spending is required to be
a function only of the productivity of the networks and not allowed to depend on the country
in which the network is located. In the present setting, non-discrimination implies symmetric
7Analyzing asymmetries is di¢ cult in their setting because the model features a continuum of types. Charac-
terizing asymmetric equilibria then amounts to ￿nding the solution to a pair of asymmetric di⁄erential equations.
Introducing asymmetries is straightforward with a discrete type space.
14regulatory policies: q1 = q2 = q = (q; b q; e q;q) and u1 = u2 = u = (u; b u; e u;u). Conversely,
symmetry implies non-discrimination and proportionality.8
Under proportionality and non-discrimination, the CRA sets q and u to maximize ￿1W1(q;q;u)+
￿2W2(q;q;u) subject to the participation constraint
u ￿ 0, (PCCr)
and incentive compatibility constraints
u ￿ e u + ￿(e q), b u ￿ u + ￿(q), (IC
Cr)
e u ￿ u ￿ ￿(q), u ￿ b u ￿ ￿(b q). (ICCr)
As under Separation, the relevant constraints are downward incentive compatibility (IC
Cr),
low type participation (e u = u = 0) and monotonicity
q ￿ e q, b q ￿ q. (6)
Operator rent is minimized by extracting all surplus from the low type while paying the high
type precisely the informational rent. Substituting u = (￿(e q);￿(q);0;0) into the symmetric
weighted welfare function I obtain the common regulatory agency￿ s policy function
￿Cr(q) = v2[P(q;q)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) ￿ (1 + ￿) (q=￿)]









Maximizing ￿Cr(q) over q and subject to q ￿ e q and b q ￿ q yields:
Lemma 3 Under Common regulation, the unique symmetric optimal policy qCr = (qCr; b qCr; e qCr;qCr)
is characterized by
2P0
1(qCr;qCr)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(qCr=￿)=￿
2P0
1(b qCr; e qCr)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(b qCr=￿)=￿
2P0










If network quality is a normal good, then quality increases the more weight is placed on the
national welfare of country with the largest gains from trade (If condition (NG) holds and 4Si >
8Observe that the NSOs are treated symmetrically ex ante because they are o⁄ered the same menu of contracts
to choose from, but are treated asymmetrically ex post if they choose di⁄erent contracts.
154Sj, then @qCr=@￿i > 0).9
The proof is in the Appendix.
Concentrating regulatory responsibility in the hands of a single regulatory agency gets rid of the
productive ine¢ ciency because maintenance spending is now optimally distributed throughout




1(b qCr; e qCr)
P0
2(b qCr; e qCr)
=
 0(b qCr=￿)





which is independent of the distribution (￿1;￿2) of political power. Establishing a common
regulatory agency has no bearing on the agency problem. The incentive distortion persists, and
the marginal rate of substitution equals the virtual marginal technical rate of substitution.
There could be over- or under-spending under Common regulation depending on the dis-
tribution of political power. If the gains from trade are asymmetrically distributed across the
countries (4Si > 4Sj), the perceived marginal bene￿t of network reliability under Common
regulation is higher the more weight is placed on the country with the most to gain from in-
tegration and therefore maintenance spending is higher. Under simple majority rule (￿i = 1)
there will be excessive maintenance spending even compared to the ￿rst-best (qCr > qfb) if the
social cost of transfers (￿v) is low.
3.3 Integration
Under the framework of Integration, system operation is concentrated in the hands of a common
system operator (CSO), regulated by a common regulatory agency (CRA). To emphasize the
e⁄ect of network structure, I assume sub-cost observability: The regulator observes and can
contract on q1 and q2 separately even when there is a single system operator. If the regulator
could observe and contract upon only a composite function of quality q, say network reliability
P(q), Integration would be less appealing because of a narrower span of enforceable contracts.
I discuss the implications of sub-cost observability below; see also La⁄ont and Tirole (1993).
The regulatory problem under Integration is one of multi-dimensional asymmetric informa-
tion. Any feasible contract must satisfy the participation constraint:
u(￿) =
P
i=1;2[ti(￿) ￿  (qi(￿)=￿i)] ￿ 0 8￿ 2 f￿;￿g2 (PCI)
9The restriction to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) contracts is without loss of generality
here. Optimality of direct contracts follows from the Revelation Principle. Under Bayesiean implementation, the
downward-binding incentive constraint is vu+(1￿v)b u = v(e u+￿(e q))+(1￿v)(u+￿(q)), the low type￿ s participation
constraint is ve u + (1 ￿ v)u = 0, and the monotonicity constraint is v￿(q) + (1 ￿ v)￿(b q) ￿ v￿(e q) + (1 ￿ v)￿(q).
Substituting expected operator rent v￿(e q) + (1 ￿ v)￿(q) into the policy function and maximizing over q yields
(8). The monotonicity constraint is satis￿ed by this solution because q
Cr > e q
Cr and b q
Cr > q
Cr. Hence, Bayesian
and dominant strategy implementation yield exactly the same optimal policy; see Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1992) for more on this topic.
16and the incentive compatibility constraint
u(￿) ￿
P
i=1;2[ti(b) ￿  (qi(b)=￿i)] 8(b;￿) 2 f￿;￿g4. (ICI)
The CSO possesses an informational advantage over the two national system operators NSOs
as the CSO (by assumption) holds private information about the productivity ￿ = (￿1;￿2) of the
entire grid. Unlike the two NSOs, the CSO is able to coordinate the performance of the various
parts of the grid to maximize informational rent (recall, the regulatory policies are in dominating
strategies under Common regulation): The CSO has more agency power than the two NSOs.
The advantage of having fewer system operators is cross-subsidization: It is only necessary to
meet the aggregate pro￿tability and incentive constraints of the CSO, and not one for each
individual NSO. These costs and bene￿ts will be more apparent later. As under Common
regulation, political con￿ ict may yield incentives for transfer exploitation across countries. I
therefore assume that contracts are required to be symmetric even under Integration.
Even here the main concern is the incentive of the CSO for understating the productivity
of the network. Therefore, the feasibility constraints (PCI) and (ICI) can be replaced by the
lowest type￿ s participation constraint u = e u = 0, the downward-binding incentive compatibility
constraints
2u = maxfb u + e u + ￿(e q);2u + 2￿(q)g
b u + e u = 2u + ￿(q)
, (IC
I)
and the monotonicity constraint:
minfq; b qg ￿ maxfe q;qg. (9)
Substituting the binding constraints into the policy function ￿1W1(q;q;u)+￿2W2(q;q;u), the
CRA￿ s problem reduces to maximizing
￿I(q;u) = v2[P(q;q)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) ￿ (1 + ￿) (q=￿)] ￿ ￿v2u
+ v(1 ￿ v)[2P(b q; e q)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) ￿ (1 + ￿)( (b q=￿) +  (e q=￿))]





over q and u, subject to 2u ￿ ￿(q) + maxf￿(e q);￿(q)g and monotonicity (9):
Lemma 4 The optimal symmetric policy qI = (qI; b qI; e qI;qI), under Integration is characterized
17by
2P0
1(qI;qI)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(qI=￿)=￿
2P0
1(b qI; e qI)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(b qI=￿)=￿
2P0
















+ ￿I = ￿v2=2
e ￿
I
(2uI ￿ ￿(qI) ￿ ￿(e qI)) = 0




￿ 0 and ￿I ￿ 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with 2uI ￿ ￿(qI) + ￿(e qI)
and 2uI ￿ 2￿(qI). If network quality is a normal good (condition (NG) holds), then P(b qI; e qI) >
P(b qCr; e qCr), but P(qI;qI) < P(qCr;qCr).
The proof is in the Appendix.
Under Integration, coordination of maintenance spending yields productive e¢ ciency, same as
under Common regulation. However, productive e¢ ciency depends on the ability of the NRA to
contract on q1 and q2, separately. Suppose instead that the NRA can only contract on network
reliability p. This contractual incompleteness implies that the NRA is forced to delegate the
distribution of maintenance spending to the CSO. If network productivity di⁄ers across the
network (￿1 = ￿ > ￿ = ￿2), the CSO￿ s cost-minimizing choice of maintenance spending is
characterized by:
￿P0
1(b qI; e qI)
￿P0













, P(b qI; e qI) = p.
Under delegation, the CSO fails to internalize the social cost of operator rent and therefore
spends too much on maintenance in the low productivity part of the network compared to the
second-best. Productive ine¢ ciency stemming from delegation would render Integration less
appealing from a welfare point of view.
Di⁄erences arise between Common regulation and Integration even absent any delegation
problems under Integration. Under Common regulation, two system operators independently
strive to maximize their rent. Under Integration, a single system operator exercises agency
power. The ability to jointly understate the performance of the common network (report (￿;￿)
when the true type is (￿;￿)) jacks up the virtual marginal maintenance cost of the least produc-
tive network (of type (￿;￿)) and reduces the virtual marginal maintenance cost of intermediate
networks (￿i = ￿ > ￿ = ￿j) under Integration.10 Agency power thus yields more extreme
10The di⁄erence in virtual marginal maintenance cost between Integration and Common regulation equals
18incentives with network quality less distorted in the intermediate case and more distorted in the
low productivity case under Integration than Common regulation.
4 Comparison of network structures
Common regulation versus Separation System operators spend too little on network
maintenance under Separation by failing to internalize gains from energy integration abroad.
Production ine¢ ciencies stemming from uncoordinated maintenance expenditures exacerbate
the distortions. The common regulatory agency (CRA) restores coordination and thus produc-
tive e¢ ciency, but does not necessarily correct the distortions in aggregate maintenance spending
appropriately. Whether Common regulation generates incentives for excessive or inferior main-
tenance spending depends on how the CRA balances the political in￿ uence (￿1;￿2) of the two
member states. Too much weight on the country that values energy integration the most (￿i
is high when 4Si > 4Sj) leads to over-spending owing to exaggerated perceived gains from
trade. Under-spending occurs when the perceived gains from trade are underrated. Appropriate
maintenance spending requires balanced political in￿ uence:
Proposition 1 Assume that network quality is a normal good. Common regulation then welfare
dominates Separation if and only if political in￿uence of the two countries is balanced. Separation
strictly welfare dominates Common regulation and Integration if political in￿uence is biased
strongly in favour of a country with little to gain from market integration.
The proof is in the Appendix.
With an equal distribution of political in￿ uence across countries, no member state can exert
enough in￿ uence over the regulatory policy to tilt it in one￿ s own favour. With political balance,
the regulatory policy maximizes total welfare. Under simple majority voting, political balance
is strongly biased: The median voter holds dictatorial powers over regulatory policy. If it so
happens that the median voter is located in a country with small gains from market integration,
the problem of inferior maintenance spending is so serious that productive ine¢ ciencies become
of second order for network reliability. Maintaining multiple regulators then is better from a
welfare perspective than creating a common regulatory agency.
What kind of political process could possibly lead to the creation of a common regulatory
agency (CRA) whose policies would be to the detriment of individual member states? Obviously,
if the policies of the common regulatory agency would be subject to unanimous approval by all
countries, the regulatory policy under Common regulation would constitute a Pareto improve-
ment. The CRA would then be maximizing a weighted average of national welfare subject to
the political participation constraint, Wi(Q;ui) ￿ Wi(QS;uS
i ), i = 1;2. Welfare losses arise








2 in the low productivity case;
compare (8) and (11).
19participation constraints or (ii) whoever holds the veto right in each country pursues a di⁄erent
objective than national welfare maximization. The European Union constitutes an example of
multi-national political cooperation with limited veto rights. Participation in the EU is vol-
untary, but the member states have delegated important policy decisions to EU authorities,
energy policy being a prominent example. Note also that Proposition 1 has policy rami￿cations
also under voluntary participation. Even if the countries have agreed to a common regulatory
agency, welfare is higher the more balanced is the political in￿ uence of the member states.11
I have assumed proportional and non-discriminatory (symmetric) regulation as a means to
curbing the problem of transfer exploitation. Yet, it appears not to have any real e⁄ect here. If
political power is perfectly balanced (￿1 = ￿2 = 1=2), the common regulatory agency maximizes
aggregate welfare even with full discretion over transfers and incentives. However, the impor-
tance of proportionality and non-discrimination depends not only on the distribution (￿1;￿2)
of political in￿ uence, but also on the distribution (4S1;4S2) of the gains from integration.
Assume that the gains from integration are symmetric, i.e. 4S1 = 4S2 = 4S. Then, the
perceived marginal bene￿t of integration equals
2P0
i(q)(￿14S1 + ￿24S1) = 2P0
i(q)(￿1 + ￿2)4S = 2P0
i(q)4S
under symmetric regulation, which is completely independent of the distribution of political
power. Under symmetric gains from trade and under the assumption of symmetric policies,
welfare maximization results even under simple majority rule. Welfare maximization would not
occur if the CRA could discriminate between the countries. Under simple majority rule (￿i =
1), and for any domestic regulatory policy qi, the country in power would push maintenance
spending abroad as high as possible (raise qj up to the point at which Wj(Q;uj) = Wj(QS;uS
j )
under voluntary participation) because the perceived social costs of transfers abroad is zero.
Symmetry arising from proportionality and non-discrimination forces the CRA to internalize
parts of the social costs of transfers abroad. Under symmetric gains from integration, there is
full internalization.
La⁄ont and Pouyet (2003) analyse the costs and bene￿ts of decentralized policies in a multi-
national procurement model. Unlike in the present paper where voters are distinguished by the
country they reside in (interjurisdictional heterogeneity), La⁄ont and Pouyet (2003) assume that
voters either are shareholders or non-shareholders (intrajurisdictional heterogeneity). Under
centralized procurement the buyer places more weight on ￿rm rent than consumer surplus if
shareholders are in overall majority, but cares nothing about ￿rm rent if shareholders are in
overall minority. A main result is that centralized procurement welfare dominates decentralized
procurement if and only if votes are asymmetrically distributed between shareholders and non-
shareholders. This is the exact opposite of Proposition 1. La⁄ont and Pouyet￿ s (2003) result can
be traced to a peculiar speci￿cation of the objective function of the centralized buyer. Under
11Bargaining over regulatory policies would maximize aggregate welfare if the NRAs had access to productivity
dependent lump-sum transfers. Typically, regulators have limited possibilities for side transfers. Side transfers
among system operators (typically in the form of cross-border congestion rents) will not do as a substitute because
they might interfere with incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
20shareholder majority, the weight of consumer surplus relative to ￿rm rent by assumption is
higher the larger is shareholder majority. Consumer surplus and ￿rm rent have near equal
weights in the limit when almost everybody is a shareholder, in which case the centralized buyer
acts almost as the benevolent social planner.
Whether political con￿ ict in transmission regulation can best be described as "cross-border"
or "cross-ownership" depends on who owns and manages the grid. With state-owned national
system operators, as in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, it makes more sense to think in terms of
cross-border con￿ icts because all citizens have identical stakes in the national ￿rm. Transmission
regulation is more susceptible to political in￿ uence by shareholders in Finland where the system
operator, Fingrid, is partially privately owned.
Common regulation versus Integration The previous section analysed the costs and ben-
e￿ts of creating a common regulatory agency versus maintaining as structure of national regu-
latory agencies, holding ￿xed the structure of national system operators. This section instead
analyses the costs of bene￿ts of having a common system operator versus national system opera-
tors, ￿xing the regulatory structure. The question of whether a common system operator (CSO)
is better than two national system operators (NSOs) is a question of whether the informational
rent externalities are positive or negative under the di⁄erent structures.
Assume that the common regulatory agency (CRA) wants to implement the symmetric policy
q = (q; b q; e q;q), where q satis￿es the monotonicity constraint maxfq; b qg ￿ minfe q;qg. The CRA
can implement q both under a single CSO and when system operation is split between two
NSOs by applying an appropriate menu of transfers.12 Expected network reliability and social
maintenance costs are the same irrespective of how system operation is managed. The optimal
structure of system operation then boils down to minimizing expected operator rent. Merging
the two NSOs into a CSO is a cost e¢ cient way of implementing q if and only if
v2(￿(q) + maxf￿(e q);￿(q)g) + 2v(1 ￿ v)￿(q) < 2v2￿(e q) + 2v(1 ￿ v)￿(q),
in which case the expected operator rent is lower with a CSO than two NSOs.
Merging system operation is pro￿table if e q > q and unpro￿table if e q < q. To understand this
result, assume that both networks are of high productivity (￿ = f￿;￿g). An understatement
of productivity from ￿ to ￿ by NSO j a⁄ects the regulatory policies of both NSOs owing to
the interdependence of marginal network reliability. This informational rent externality equals
￿(q) ￿ ￿(e q) and is negative if e q > q, but positive if e q < q. Thus, merging system operation
into a CSO is optimal whenever the informational rent externalities are negative, while splitting
system operation between two NSOs is optimal under positive informational rent externalities.
The sign of the informational rent externalities depends crucially on whether the network
displays complementarities or substitutability. The network externality is negative under com-
12The appropriate transfers to the CSO are 2t = 2 (q=￿)+￿(q)+maxf￿(e q);￿(q)g, b t+e t =  (b q=￿)+ (e q=￿)+￿(q)
and 2t = 2 (q=￿). The appropriate transfers to each NSO are t =  (q=￿) + ￿(e q), b t =  (b q=￿) + ￿(q), e t =  (e q=￿)
and t
I =  (q=￿).
21plementarity: Lower productivity in network i triggers a reduction in maintenance spending
everywhere because the virtual marginal maintenance cost goes up in network i and the mar-
ginal bene￿t of maintenance spending falls in network j. The rent externality is negative because
informational rent is increasing in maintenance spending. By merging system operation into a
single CSO, the regulatory agency forces the networks to internalize the negative rent externality
by means of cross-subsidization:
Proposition 2 Assume that the network displays complementarities (P00
ij > 0 for all q). Then,
the common regulatory agency prefers a common system operator to two national system opera-
tors. If also political in￿uence of the two countries is balanced (￿1 ￿ 1=2), so that the common
regulatory agency internalizes most of the gains from market integration, Integration welfare
dominates both Common regulation and Separation.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Negative informational rent externalities under quality complementarity render Integration bet-
ter than Common regulation from the regulator￿ s point of view. The regulator acts as the
benevolent social planner when political power is balanced. In that case, Integration is the
socially optimal network structure.13
Based on the above results, it might be tempting to draw the conclusion that network
substitutability gives rise to positive network externalities. But this is not always true. Lower
productivity in network i implies a reduction in optimal maintenance spending in network i
under all network structures because the virtual marginal maintenance cost of network i is
higher the lower is the productivity of that network. The quality reduction in network i tends to
increase maintenance spending in network j under quality substitutability. However, the ability
of the CSO to understate performance of the entire network drives up the virtual marginal
maintenance cost for the lowest productivity network under Integration. A higher marginal cost
tends to lower optimal maintenance spending in the lowest productivity network. If the social
cost of informational rent (￿v) is high, the cost e⁄ect dominates the substitution e⁄ect and
so negative network externalities persist under Integration also under quality substitutability:
e qI > qI. On the other hand, if the social cost of informational rent is low, Integration generates
positive network externalities (qI > e qI):
Proposition 3 Under network substitutability (P00
ij < 0 for all q) and if the social cost of
informational rent (￿v) is low, informational rent externalities are positive under Integration
(e qI < qI). The common regulatory agency then prefers to divide system operation between two
national system operators instead of having a common system operator. If also network quality
13Integration is optimal among all network structures in Table 1 under the conditions of Proposition 2. For
￿i ￿ 1=2, Integration welfare dominates even Common agency because the regulatory policy q
I then is close to
the socially optimal, conditionally on there being a single CSO.
22is a normal good and political in￿uence of the two countries is balanced (￿1 ￿ 1=2), Common
regulation welfare dominates Integration as well as Separation.
The proof is in the Appendix.
The common system operator internalizes the positive rent externality by coordinating perfor-
mance in all parts of the network. This exercise of agency power drives up the informational
rent under Integration. The common regulatory agency mitigates agency power by splitting
system operation among a set of national system operators and setting up a dominant strategy
incentive structure.
The costs and bene￿ts of having a common system operator (CSO) versus maintaining two
national system operators (NSOs) resemble the costs and bene￿ts of monopoly versus duopoly
in an unregulated market. The monopoly exercises more market power than the duopoly. Yet,
monopoly is better provided the monopoly exhibits su¢ cient cost synergies to o⁄set the nega-
tive e⁄ects of market power. Owing to its monopoly on information about network productivity,
the CSO exercises more agency power than two separate NSOs. Nonetheless, a CSO is opti-
mal provided the cost synergies arising from merging system operation are strong enough. In
the present context, these cost synergies stem from cross-subsidization. With a single system
operator, the regulator has to worry about aggregate incentives, whereas the incentive and par-
ticipation constraints of each NSO constrain the set of feasible regulatory policies when there
are more than one system operator.
Dana (1993) is the ￿rst to emphasize the importance of informational rent externalities for
the optimal market structure of a regulated industry. Dana exclusively focuses on negative
rent externalities as a motivation for granting monopoly rights and labeled them informational
economies of scope (in the present context, the equivalent of Dana￿ s assumption would be inde-
pendence: P12 = P21 = 0 for all q). Positive rent externalities would correspond to informational
diseconomies of scope.
Serevinov (2008) studies optimal organization of production in a model with a single principal
and two agents. He shows that the optimal mode of organization depends on whether the value
of information is superadditive or subadditive, which here corresponds to positive versus negative
informational rent externalities. In his analysis Serevinov (2008) establishes the link between the
degree of substitutability/complementarity of inputs and additivity. Information is subadditive
if inputs are weak complements or weak substitutes (i.e. in the present context, the condition is
jPijj=jPiij < z for all q and some 0 < z ￿ 1) and it is superadditive if inputs are asymmetric and
inputs are strong complements or substitutes.14 The present paper extends Serevinov (2008)
by studying also the optimal number of principals. It complements his analysis by bringing out
the link between informational externalities and the social cost of informational rent. Quality
substitutability alone tends to generate positive rent externalities, but the cost of informational
rent pulls in the opposite direction. If the social cost is high, informational rent externalities
14Serevinov￿ s (2008) result that splitting production between several agents can be optimal under complemen-
tarity relies more on asymmetry than strong complementarity. Under symmetry, as in the present model, a single
agent is optimal no matter the degree of complementarity.
23are positive under the single-agent structure, and splitting system operation between two NSOs
need not be optimal even under strong quality substitutability.
5 Conclusion
No network governance structure does uniformly better and no governance structure performs
uniformly worse than all others in this model. Rather, optimal network structure depends on (i)
how well the common regulatory agency balances the interests of the di⁄erent member states;
(ii) how the gains from energy market integration vary across the member states; (iii) the
characteristics of the network (substitutability versus complementarity); (iv) the social cost of
operator rent.
Having a common regulatory agency is better from a welfare perspective than maintaining
national regulatory agencies on the proviso that political in￿ uence is su¢ ciently balanced across
the member states in the common regulatory agency. With an equal distribution of political
power, no member state can exert enough in￿ uence over regulatory policy to tilt it in one￿ s
own favour. The importance of balanced political in￿ uence is well understood by the European
Union. The newly established Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is
furnished with the task of coordinating transmission regulation across the EU member states and
deciding on the terms and conditions for access to cross-border infrastructure in case of national
disagreement. ACER￿ s Board of Regulators reside under instructions to act independently from
any government of a member state. Only one representative per member state may be admitted
to the Board of Regulators, and the board members have one vote each (EU, 2009a).
With balanced political in￿ uence, the preferences of the regulator are aligned with those of
the benevolent social planner. Under those conditions, a common system operator is socially
optimal under network complementarity, whereas splitting network operation is socially optimal
under network substitutability and provided the social cost of operator rent is not too high.
Whether a network displays complementarities or substitutability depends on network topology.
In a radial network, energy ￿ ows from production node A to consumption node B through a
sequence of interconnections, where the interconnector with the smallest capacity determines the
capacity of the entire network. The radial network displays a high degree of complementarity
because the value of expanding capacity in any single part of the network increases the higher is
capacity in other parts of the network. In a meshed network, energy ￿ ows from production node
A to consumption node B through a ￿ne web of interconnected transmission lines. Any single
interconnection is less important the higher is the capacity of alternative interconnections. The
meshed network therefore displays a high degree of substitutability.
Rent externalities stemming from network substitutability may have exacerbated the capac-
ity problems of the Oslofjord cable between southern Norway and southern Sweden described
in the Introduction. In May 2008, precisely when the Oslofjord cable broke down, the NorNed
cable between southern Norway and the Netherlands went operational. The longest submarine
power cable in the world, NorNed was a prestige project for its owners Statnett and TenneT (the
24dutch system operator). Reduced export capacity from Norway to Sweden over the Oslofjord
cable suddenly made NorNed immensely pro￿table: The resulting price drop in southern Norway
raised the value of electricity trade between the Netherlands and southern Norway. Being the
only transmission line directly connecting the two markets, NorNed could sell its transmission
capacity at a vastly higher price than projected. Owning the Oslofjord cable as well as half
of NorNed, Statnett probably internalized part of the positive rent externality on NorNed of
reduced capacity on the Oslofjord cable. Had NorNed instead been fully owned by TenneT, or
had the interconnection broken down on the Swedish side, the net value to the owner of repairing
the Oslofjord cable would have been higher.
I have conducted the analysis within a complete contracting framework. All necessary policy
coordination takes place at the level of regulation under complete contracting: There is no role
for delegating tasks to the system operator. While a ￿tting description of capacity regulation,
the assumption that the regulator can contract on all contingencies regarding day-to-day system
operation is unlikely to hold. Contractual incompleteness speaks in favour of establishing a com-
mon system operator to the extent multi-national energy markets require detailed coordination
of cross-border system operation.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
By the boundary condition (BC) all possible maxima of W1(Q;0) + W2(Q;0) by necessity are
contained in [0;k]8. Maximization of a continuous function on a compact set yields an optimum.
Concavity of P and strict convexity of   render aggregate welfare strictly concave, hence the
solution is unique. The solution is interior by the assumption that P0
i(0;qj) > 0 for all qj ￿ 0
and  0(0) = 0. Symmetry of P, ￿ and   render the solution symmetric. Thus, the ￿rst-order
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i =d￿j > 0 if P00
ji > 0, but dq
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i =d￿j < 0 if P00
ji < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that both NRAs have committed to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID)
25contracts. Consider the Lagrangian
LS
i (Q;￿i;￿i;￿i) = WS
i (Q) + ￿i(qi ￿ e qi) + ￿i(b qi ￿ q
i) + ￿iqi,
where ￿i ￿ 0 and ￿i ￿ 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with qi ￿ e qi and b qi ￿ q
i, and
￿i = (￿i; b ￿i; e ￿i;￿i) ￿ 0 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with non-negative quality,
qi ￿ 0. Concavity of P plus strict convexity of   and ￿ render WS
i strictly concave in qi. Strict
concavity of WS
i and linearity of the constraints render LS





i , i = 1;2, to the ￿rst-order conditions @LS
i =@qi = 0 and associated
complementary slackness conditions constitutes an equilibrium of this game.
De￿ne ￿i = (qi;￿i;￿i), ￿ = (￿1;￿2), li(￿) = (￿i ￿ @LS
i =@qi;qi ￿ e qi; b qi ￿ q
i) and l(￿) =




i , i = 1;2, of the game is a
solution to the complementary problem:
Find ￿ ￿ 0 such that l(￿) ￿ 0, ￿ili(￿) = 0, i = 1;2. (12)
Conversely, every solution to (12) characterizes an equilibrium of the game with ￿i appropriately
de￿ned. Thus, there are exactly as many equilibria of the game as there are solutions to (12).
The mapping l is continuously di⁄erentiable by the assumption that P0
i,  0 and ￿0 are
continuously di⁄erentiable. Thus, (12) has a unique solution if (i) every solution to (12) is
element of a compact set; (ii) l satis￿es an appropriate regularity condition; and (iii) the
Jacobian of l, eliminating rows and columns with elements of zero, is positive at all solutions to
(12); see Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987).
Condition (i): For all e q1 > k > 0,
e ￿1 ￿ @LS





￿0(e q1)) ￿ P0
1(e q1; b q2)4S1]
> v(1 ￿ v)((1 + ￿) 0(e q1=￿)=￿ ￿ P0
1(e q1; b q2)(4S1 + 4S2)) > 0
where the second inequality follows from (BC). By necessity, then, every solution to (12) satis￿es
e q1 2 [0;k]. For all q1 > k ￿ e q1,
￿1 ￿ @LS
1=@q1 = v2((1 + ￿) 0(q1=￿)=￿ ￿ P0
1(q1;q2)4S1) ￿ ￿1
which is strictly positive by (BC) and ￿1(q1 ￿ e q1) = 0. By necessity every solution to (12)
26satis￿es even q1 ￿ k. Suppose q1 = 0. Then
￿1 ￿ @LS
1=@q1 = ￿v2P0
1(0;q2)4S1 ￿ ￿1 < 0
by the assumptions that P0
1(0;q2) > 0 for all q2 ￿ 0 and  0(0) = 0. Thus, q1 2 (0;k]. By
analogous arguments, q
1 2 [0;k] and b q1 2 (0;k]. Consider next the multiplier ￿1. Since q1 > 0,
￿1 ￿ @LS
1=@q1 = 0 and therefore
￿1 = v2[(1 + ￿) 0(q1=￿)=￿ ￿ P0
1(q1;q2)4S1] ￿ max
q2[0;k]2 v2[(1 + ￿) 0(q1=￿)=￿ ￿ P0
1(q)4S1].
Thus, ￿1 ￿ 0 is bounded from above. Analogously, ￿1 ￿ 0 is bounded from above. Similarly, ￿2
is contained in a compact and convex set. This concludes the proof that every possible solution
to (12) is element of a compact (and convex) set.
Condition (ii): The regularity condition states at every solution ￿ to (12), ￿i = 0 implies
li(￿) > 0. Regularity is a generic property and satis￿ed for almost all parameter values.
Condition (iii): It is easy to verify that the Jacobian of l(￿) has strictly positive leading
principal minors for all ￿ ￿ 0 and therefore is positive de￿nite.
The complementary problem (12) has a unique solution and there exists a unique equilibrium
of the game for generic parameter values. To verify that this solution is given by (5), it is su¢ cient
to check that (5) satis￿es QS > 0, qS
i > e qS
i and b qS
i > qS
i . The assumptions P0
1(0;q2) > 0 for all
q2 ￿ 0, P0
2(q1;0) > 0 for all q1 ￿ 0 and  0(0) = ￿0(0) = 0 render the solution interior (QS > 0).
I ￿nally demonstrate that qS
i > e qS
i and b qS
i > qS
i . De￿ne the generalized (strictly convex) virtual
maintenance cost
c(qi;￿i) = (1 + ￿)[
￿i￿￿
￿￿￿  (qi=￿) +
￿￿￿i















where I have used ￿(qi) =  (qi=￿) ￿  (qi=￿). Let c0
i(qi;￿i) = @c(qi;￿i)=@qi and c00
ii(qi;￿i) =
@2c(qi;￿i)=@q2
i > 0. De￿ne qS(￿i;￿j) as the implicit solution to P0
i(qS)4Si = c0
i(qS
i ;￿i), i = 1;2.
Now, qS



































i (￿i;￿)=@￿i]d￿i > 0.
27Having established existence and uniqueness, I turn now to the comparative statics of the
equilibrium contracts. Consider ￿rst the problem of overall under-spending (P(qS) < P(qfb)).
The proof is in two steps. First, I consider under-spending as a failure to internalize trade
externalities, ignoring the e⁄ects of informational rent. I then show that informational rent adds
an additional distortion under Separation. De￿ne zfb(￿) as the implicit solution to P0
i(zfb)(4Si+
￿4Sj) =  0(z
fb
i =￿i)=￿i, i;j = 1;2, i 6= j. By construction zfb(1) = qfb, and z
fb
i (0) is the
equilibrium under Separation when the NRAs do not take the social cost of informational rent
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which is positive under condition (NG). Hence, P(qfb) > P(zfb(0)). Consider next the e⁄ect of
informational rent. Di⁄erentiate qS























which can be positive or negative. Total di⁄erentiation of P(qS) with respect to v yields after





























Under condition (NG), dP(qS)=dv ￿ 0. Since qS
i;v=0 = z
fb
i (0), P(qS) ￿ P(zfb(0)). Under
condition (NG), therefore, P(qS) ￿ P(zfb(0)) < P(qfb).
To see that NSO 1 overinvests relative to NSO 2 under Separation when 4S1 > 4S2, ￿x











where ￿ 2 [1;4S1=4S2]. Under the assumption of two NSOs, the second-best optimal distribu-
28tion of quality is (x1(1);x2(1)) because this is the point at which the marginal rate of substitution
equals the (virtual) marginal technical rate of substitution, whereas (x1(4S1=4S2);x2(4S1=4S2)) =
(qS
1 (￿);qS























which is strictly positive under condition (NG). Thus, 4S1 > 4S2 implies relative overinvest-
ment in 1 (qS
1 (￿) > x1(1)) and under-spending in 2 (qS
2 (￿) < x2(1)) under Separation.
The relevance of dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) mechanisms
under Separation
The restriction to dominant strategy implementable direct (DSID) mechanisms is without loss
of generality in the sense that every dominant strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of a regu-
lation game with general message space (de￿ned below), can equivalently be represented as the
equilibrium of a game where both regulators have committed to o⁄ering direct DSID mecha-
nisms.
Consider a regulatory game with a general message space. Assume that each national reg-
ulatory agency (NRA) i = 1;2 has committed to a message space Ai, and a regulatory policy
(q￿
i ;t￿
i) : A ! R+ ￿R, where A = (Ai;Aj) (by the assumption of full transparency, the message
space and regulatory polices are common knowledge). Let q￿ = (q￿
i ;q￿




i(￿i) 2 Ai be the message chosen by national system operator (NSO) i of type ￿i 2 f￿;￿g
under the regulatory policy (q￿;t￿), and write a￿(￿) = (a￿
i(￿i);a￿
j(￿j)). In a dominant strategy
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the regulation game with general message space A, (q￿;t￿) and





i(￿i);aj) ￿  (q￿
i (a￿
i(￿i);aj)=￿i) ￿ t￿
i(ai;aj) ￿  (q￿
i (ai;aj)=￿i) (14)
t￿
i(a￿(￿)) ￿  (q￿
i (a￿(￿))=￿i) ￿ 0. (15)
Condition (14) states that messages are required to be dominant strategies in regards to all mes-
sages reached by the opponent with positive probability, i.e. a￿
j(￿) and a￿
j(￿), but does not require
dominance in regards to the entire message space Aj. Condition (15) states that participation
should be pro￿table in equilibrium. Stronger strategy requirements, like dominance regarding
the entire message space Aj, could be placed on the regulatory policies. These added restrictions
would (weakly) limit the set of equilibrium policies. A further equilibrium requirement is that
29there exists no (qi;ti) with corresponding messages fb a(￿)g￿2f￿;￿g2, where b ai(￿i) 2 Ai is the
message chosen by i of type ￿i 2 f￿;￿g under the regulatory policy (qi;q￿
j;ti;t￿
j), satisfying for
i 6= j = 1;2, every ￿ 2 f￿;￿g2 and for all ai;aj 2 Ai ￿ fb aj(￿);b aj(￿)g:
ti(b ai(￿i);aj) ￿  (qi(b ai(￿i);aj)=￿i) ￿ ti(ai;aj) ￿  (qi(ai;aj)=￿i); (16)











j(a￿(￿))4Si ￿  (qi(a￿(￿))=￿i) ￿ ￿ti(a￿(￿))]
= W(q￿;t￿),
(18)
where Pr(￿;￿) = v2, etc. Conditions (16)-(18) state that there should exist no strictly pro￿table
dominant strategy implementable policy deviation (qi;ti) for i. Conditions (14)-(18) jointly
de￿ne a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (because out-of-equilibrium beliefs remain unspeci￿ed).
Consider instead an alternative game in which both regulators commit to o⁄ering DSID
mechanisms. For i = 1;2, let qS
i (￿) = q￿
i (a￿(￿)) and tS
i (￿) = t￿
i(a￿(￿)). It is easy to verify that
(14) and (15) render truth-telling a (weakly) dominant strategy and participation pro￿table in
the direct mechanism. To show that (qS;tS) does constitute an equilibrium, I need to verify
that i cannot pro￿tably deviate from (qS
i ;tS
i ) to some other DSID policy (e qi;e ti) given (qS
j ;tS
j ).
Suppose, on the contrary, that such a pro￿table deviation (e qi;e ti) would exist. Return to the





(e qi(￿);e ti(￿)) if a = a￿(￿)
(h > 0;0) for all a = 2 fa￿
i(￿);a￿
i(￿)g ￿ Aj
Under the assumption that j does not alter its message strategy with the introduction of the
alternative strategy (qi;ti), i.e. b aj(￿) = a￿
j(￿) and b aj(￿) = a￿
j(￿) holds, DSID of (e qi;e ti) implies
that an NSO i of type ￿i 2 f￿;￿g earns a non-negative pro￿t by reporting b ai(￿i) = a￿
i(￿i)
and cannot bene￿t from deviating to a￿
i(bi), where bi 2 f￿;￿g and bi 6= ￿i. Deviating to
ai = 2 fa￿
i(￿);a￿
i(￿)g is strictly unpro￿table because then ti(a) ￿  (qi(a)=￿i) = ￿ (h=￿i) < 0.
Given that j does not modify its message strategy under the new policy, it is not pro￿table for i
to alter its message strategy either. Since the regulatory policy (q￿
j;t￿
j) is the same as before, it
is optimal for j to maintain its message strategy b aj(￿j) = a￿
j(￿j) for all ￿j 2 f￿;￿g given that
i does not alter its message strategy under the new policy. Hence, unaltered message strategies
30are mutually optimal, and therefore (qi;ti) satis￿es (16) and (17). Moreover
Wi(qi;q￿
j;ti;t￿
j) = Wi(e qi;qS
j ;e ti;tS
j ) > Wi(qS;tS) = Wi(q￿;t￿),
where the equalities hold by construction of the regulatory policies (e qi;e ti) and (qS;tS), and
the inequality follows from the assumption that a deviation to (e qi;e ti) is strictly pro￿table.
The existence of a pro￿table unilateral deviation contradicts the assumption that (q￿;t￿) is an
equilibrium. Hence, if (q￿;t￿) is indeed an equilibrium, then there cannot exist any pro￿table
unilateral DSID deviation (e qi;e ti) from (qS
i ;tS
i ) and therefore (qS;tS) constitutes an equilibrium.
The equilibrium policies and welfare are the same in both games, hence they are equivalent.
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the unconstrained maximization of ￿Cr(q). I verify ex post that the (unique) solution
satis￿es qCr > 0, qCr > e qCr and b qCr > qCr. By the boundary condition (BC), all maxima of ￿Cr
by necessity are contained in [0;k]4. Maximization of a continuous function on a compact set
yields an optimum. Concavity of P, strict convexity of   and convexity of ￿ render ￿Cr strictly
concave, hence the optimum is unique and given by qCr, characterized in (8). The solution is
interior (qCr > 0) by the assumption that P0
1(0;q2) > 0 for all q2 ￿ 0 and  0(0) = ￿0(0) = 0.
Now to the monotonicity constraints.
Quality complementarity implies qCr > b qCr > e qCr > qCr: Recall the generalized virtual
maintenance cost (13) and de￿ne implicitly qCr(￿) by 2P0
i(qCr)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = c0
i(qCr
i ;￿i),




























qCr > b qCr if P00
ij > 0. Similarly, e qCr ￿ qCr =
R ￿
￿ (@qCr
i (￿;￿j)=@￿j)d￿j implies e qCr > qCr if
P00
ij > 0. I complete the quality complementarity case by showing that b qCr > e qCr if P00
ij > 0.
Suppose on the contrary that P00
ij > 0 and e qCr ￿ b qCr. Convexity of   and ￿ then imply
P0
1(e qCr; b qCr) > P0
1(b qCr; e qCr); see (8). By P00
11 < 0, e qCr ￿ b qCr implies P0
1(b qCr; e qCr) ￿ P0
1(e qCr; e qCr).
Complementarity and e qCr ￿ b qCr imply P0
1(e qCr; e qCr) ￿ P0
1(e qCr; b qCr). Combining these inequal-
ities I arrive at a contradiction: P0
1(e qCr; b qCr) > P0
1(b qCr; e qCr) ￿ P0
1(e qCr; e qCr) ￿ P0
1(e qCr; b qCr).
Thus, quality complementarity implies b qCr > e qCr.
Quality substitutability implies b qCr > qCr > qCr > e qCr: If P00
ij < 0, then @qCr
i (￿)=@￿j < 0
and therefore b qCr > qCr and qCr > e qCr, see above. Finally, P00
ij < 0 implies qCr > qCr. Subtract













For qCr ￿ qCr, the right-hand side of the above expression is strictly positive because  00 > 0
and ￿0 > 0 for all qCr > 0. Under quality substitutability, qCr ￿ qCr implies that the left-hand
side is non-positive because dP0
1(q1;q1) = (P00
11(q1;q1) + P00
12(q1;q1))dq1 < 0 - a contradiction.
Thus, P00
ij < 0 implies qCr > qCr.

























which is strictly positive if 4Si > 4Sj and condition (NG) holds. A similar expression holds
for dqCr
2 =d￿i > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4
Construct the Lagrangian
LI(q;u) = ￿I(q;u) +e ￿(2u ￿ ￿(q) ￿ ￿(e q)) + 2￿(u ￿ ￿(q)),
where e ￿ and ￿ are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with 2uI ￿ ￿(q) + ￿(e q) and 2uI ￿
2￿(q). Ignore for the moment the monotonicity constraint minfq; b qg ￿ maxfe q;qg and the non-
negativity constraint q ￿ 0. Concavity of ￿I(q;u) and of both constraints imply concavity of
LI(q;u). Hence, the ￿rst-order conditions and complementary slackness conditions characterized
in (11) are necessary and su¢ cient for optimality of LI(q;u). By the boundary condition (BC),
every solution to the problem of maximizing ￿I(q;(￿(q) + maxf￿(e q);￿(q)g)=2) is contained in
[0;k]4. Maximization of a continuous function over a compact (and convex) domain yields an
optimum. The solution is interior (qI > 0) by the assumptions that P0
1(0;q2) > 0 for all q2 ￿ 0
and  0(0) = ￿0(0) = 0. To complete the existence proof, I verify the monotonicity constraint
minfqI; b qIg ￿ maxfe qI;qIg.
Quality complementarity implies qI > b qI > e qI > qI: Assume that e qI > qI. Then, 2uI ￿
32￿(qI)+￿(e qI) > 2￿(qI) and so ￿I = 0. Since e ￿
I
+￿I = ￿v2=2, then e ￿
I
= ￿v2=2. De￿ne zI(￿) by
2P0










j(zI)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(zI
j=￿)=￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
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Plugging ￿I = 0 and e ￿
I
= ￿v2 into (11), it follows that zI
i (1) = e qI, zI
j(1) = b qI and zI
i (0) =
zI
j(0) = qI. Straightforward di⁄erentiation of zI(￿) yields dzI
i =d￿ > 0 and dzI
j=d￿ > 0 if P00
ij > 0.
So for P00
ij > 0, e qI > qI is indeed consistent. The proofs that qI > b qI and b qI > e qI under quality
complementarity are analogous the proofs in Lemma 3 that P00
ij > 0 implies qCr > b qCr and
b qCr > e qCr and are thus omitted.
Quality substitutability implies b qI > qI > maxfe qI;qIg: The proofs that b qI > qI and qI > qI
under quality substitutability are analogous to the proofs in Lemma 3 that P00
ij < 0 implies b qCr >
qCr and qCr > qCr and are thus omitted. The proof that qI > e qI under quality substitutability
is analogous the proof in Lemma 2 that qS
i > e qS
i and is also omitted.
The ￿nal part is to compare quality levels under Integration with quality levels under Com-
mon regulation. Moving from Common regulation to Integration is qualitatively the same as
lowering the virtual marginal maintenance cost of the least productive network when the two
networks di⁄er in productivity. The di⁄erence is (￿v2 +2￿I)￿0(e q)=2v(1￿v) > 0. Under quality
complementarity, lower marginal cost in one part of the network translates into higher mainte-
nance spending in the entire network. Thus, b qI > b qCr and e qI > e qCr in this case. A switch from
Common regulation to Integration is qualitatively the same as raising the virtual marginal cost
of both networks by the same factor when the two networks have the same low productivity.
The di⁄erence is (￿v2 + 2￿I)￿0(q)=2(1 ￿ v)2 > 0. Under quality complementarity, higher mar-
ginal costs in both parts of the network translate into lower maintenance spending in the entire
network. Thus, qI < qCr in this case.
Under quality substitutability, P0
1(q1;q1) is strictly decreasing in q1. Thus, qI ￿ qCr would
imply P0
1(qI;qI) ￿ P0
1(qCr;qCr). Convexity and the di⁄erence in virtual marginal maintenance
would yield P0
1(qI;qI) > P0
1(qCr;qCr) for qI ￿ qCr, see the ￿rst-order conditions. This is a
contradiction. Thus, qI < qCr even under quality substitutability. The case when the two
networks di⁄er in productivity is more complicated. Again, e qI > e qCr owing to a lower marginal
cost under Integration. However, b qI < b qCr due to quality substitutability. The overall e⁄ect on
network reliability is ambiguous, but under condition (NG), the direct e⁄ect dominates and so
33P(b qI; e qI) > P(b qCr; e qCr); see the proof on Lemma 5 for an example of this type of result.
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall the de￿nition of the generalized virtual maintenance cost c(qi;￿i) in (13). In the case of
two national system operators, welfare is proportional to
w(q) = P(q)(4S1 + 4S2) ￿ c(q1;￿1) ￿ c(q2;￿2)
whenever the distribution of productivity is ￿ = (￿1;￿2). At ￿, the welfare di⁄erence between
Common regulation and Separation is proportional to w(qCr(￿;￿i))￿w(qS(￿)). Assume without
loss of generality that 4Si > 4Sj, and di⁄erentiate:
dw(qCr(￿;￿i))
d￿i = (P0





















where I have substituted in the ￿rst-order condition c0
i(qCr
i ;￿i) = 2P0
i(qCr)(￿14S1+￿24S2) (see
the proof of Lemma 3) and simpli￿ed. If condition (NG) holds (quality is a normal good), then
dqCr
1 =d￿i > 0 and dqCr
2 =d￿i > 0 (Lemma 3) and so w(qCr(￿;￿i)) ￿ w(qS(￿)) is single-peaked
in ￿i with a unique optimum at ￿i = 1=2. Clearly, w(q) reaches its maximum at qCr(￿;1=2)
(because the ￿rst-order conditions under Common regulation then are identical to the ones
under welfare maximization and the optimum is unique). Thus, w(qCr(￿;1=2)) > w(zS(￿)),
which together with single-peakedness proves the existence of ￿ 2 [0;1=2) and ￿ 2 (1=2;1] such
that for all ￿: w(qCr(￿;￿i)) ￿ w(qS(￿)) if and only if ￿i 2 [￿;￿] - with strict inequality in the
interior.
I complete the proof by showing that Separation welfare dominates Common regulation
and Integration for ￿2 = 1 and all 4S2 low, but positive. For ￿2 = 1, qCr ! 0 and
qI ! 0 as 4S2 ! 0 because the perceived gains from market integration then vanish. Thus,
P
i=1;2 Wi(qCr;qCr;uCr) ! P(0;0)4S1 and
P
i=1;2 Wi(qI;qI;uI) ! P(0;0)4S1 as 4S2 ! 0.
Under Separation, qS















10;￿). The policy qS
10 is also the wel-







10;0);0) > P(0;0)4S1 as 4S2 ! 0. By continuity, Separation welfare
dominates Common regulation and Integration for ￿2 = 0 and all 4S2 low, but positive.
Proof of Proposition 2
34Quality complementarity implies qCr > b qCr > e qCr > qCr, see the proof of Lemma 3. The
monotonicity constraint minfqCr; b qCrg ￿ maxfe qCr;qCrg is satis￿ed and so the CRA can im-
plement qCr under a CSO by means of the transfers 2t = 2 (qCr=￿) + ￿(qCr) + ￿(e qCr),
b t + e t =  (b qCr=￿) +  (e qCr=￿) + ￿(qCr) and 2t = 2 (qCr=￿). I omit the proof, which sim-
ply amounts to verifying that the CSO￿ s incentive and participation constraints are all met by
this contract. Weighted welfare equals
￿I(qI;uI) > ￿I(qCr;(￿(qCr) + ￿(e qCr))=2)
= ￿Cr(qCr) + ￿v2(￿(e qCr) ￿ ￿(qCr))=2
> ￿Cr(qCr).
The ￿rst inequality follows from uniqueness of qI 6= qCr under Integration. The second inequal-
ity follows from e qCr > qCr under quality complementarity and ￿0 > 0 for all qi > 0. Since qI
[qCr] is the socially optimal regulatory policy when there is a CSO [two NSOs] for ￿1 = 1=2,
Integration welfare dominates Common regulation for ￿1 ￿ 1=2 in this case. Quality comple-
mentarity implies that (NG) is satis￿ed and therefore Common regulation welfare dominates
Separation for ￿1 ￿ 1=2; see Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
Quality substitutability implies b qI > qI > maxfe qI;qIg, see the proof of Lemma 4. Both
monotonicity constraints qI ￿ e qI and b qI ￿ qI are met, so the CRA can implement qI in
dominating strategies under Common regulation by means of the transfers t =  (qI=￿)+￿(e qI),
b t =  (b qI=￿) + ￿(qI), e t =  (e qI=￿) and t =  (qI=￿). Weighted welfare equals
￿Cr(qCr) > ￿Cr(qI)
= ￿I(qI;uI) + ￿v2(￿(qI) + maxf￿(e qI);￿(qI)g ￿ 2￿(e qI))=2
T ￿I(qI;uI).
The ￿rst inequality follows from uniqueness of qCr 6= qI under Common regulation. The last
inequality is non-negative if qI ￿ e qI, in which case Common regulation is strictly better than
Integration. It is negative if qI < e qI, and the welfare di⁄erence between Integration and Common
regulation then is ambiguous. I now show how the sign of qI ￿ e qI depends on the social cost ￿v
of informational rent.
If the social cost ￿v of informational rent is low, then qI ￿ e qI. To prove this claim I only
have to verify that qI > e qI is indeed consistent for low ￿v because the ￿rst-order conditions are
35necessary and su¢ cient. If qI > e qI, then 2uI ￿ 2￿(qI) > ￿(qI) + ￿(e qI) and by implication
e ￿
I
= 0 and ￿I = ￿v2=2. Plugging these Kuhn-Tucker multipliers into (11), yields
2P0
1(qI;qI)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(qI=￿)=￿
2P0
1(b qI; e qI)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(b qI=￿)=￿
2P0
1(e qI; b qI)(￿14S1 + ￿24S2) = (1 + ￿) 0(e qI=￿)=￿
2P0




For ￿v = 0, it is easy to verify that qI > e qI by applying the same procedure used to prove
qfb > e qfb under substitutability in the proof of Lemma 2. By continuity, qI > e qI extends even
to ￿v > 0, if ￿v is not too large.
If the social cost ￿v of informational rent is large, then qI < e qI. For all large ￿v, e qI ￿ qI
would imply
P0

























which is a contradiction. To understand the ￿rst, strict inequality note that P0
1(e qI; b qI)=P0
1(qI;qI)
is bounded away from zero because (e qI; b qI) 2 [0;k]2, qI 2 [0;k] and P0
i is well de￿ned for all
q ￿ 0. Secondly,  0(qi=￿) <  0(qi=￿) for all qi > 0 and therefore limqi!0  0(qi=￿)= 0(qi=￿) ￿ 1
by continuity. Thus, the second term goes to zero as ￿v ! 1. The second, weak inequality
follows from the assumption that e qI ￿ qI, and the equality follows from the focs above.
The argument why Common regulation welfare dominates Integration and Separation if
network quality is also a normal good and political in￿ uence of the two countries is balanced
(￿1 ￿ 1=2) is the same as why Integration welfare dominates Common regulation and Separation
under quality complementarity; see the proof of Proposition 2.
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